THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE EDUCATION

By Nicholas Hans, London

Comparative Education as an academic discipline is just on the border line between humanities and sciences and thus resembles philosophy which is the foundation of both. On its social and statistical side Comparative Education has to apply the methods of sociology and mathematical statistics, in its psychological application the methods of science, and in its historical background the methods of historical research. The first question to be answered is whether the historical approach has to use methods different from the scientific approach. The differences between analysis and synthesis, between induction and deduction, or between the assumption of dogmatic axioms and working hypotheses, do not mark the frontiers of history and science. Both groups of Wissenschaflen use all these methods in equal measure and both may attain the same degree of certainty, which is liable to correction with the progress of research. In this respect history is no less 'scientific' than chemistry or biology. It is only in English usage that 'science' has a limited sense and excludes history; the German Wissenschafl covers both. What, then, is the difference ? In general terms it can be stated that the historical approach tends to ascertain individual facts, whereas the scientific approach tends to discover universal laws governing these facts. No sooner does history attempt to define the laws of human evolution than it becomes sociology; as soon as science describes individual discoveries it becomes the history of science. Neither history nor science can avoid this overlapping and any individual work of research inavoidably encroaches on the fields of the other. Pure historical description of individual facts is as devoid of meaning as pure scientific research without any reference to space and time and the individual scientist. Nevertheless, the logical difference between the two approaches remains valid, although in practice it is seldom followed in all its rigidity. In its development, history always had some universal assumption which 'interpreted' individual facts. Either it was the divine revelation of the Bible, the Koran or other sacred books which gave the religious-philosophical foundation to historical narrative; or it was philosophy, whether in its idealistic form as in Hegelianism, or materialistic form as in Marxism; or it was the biological hypothesis of evolution and human progress which supplied the 'meaning' to the skeleton of history. In this interpretation, history unavoidably has to use teleological ideas and to employ final causes side by side with physical, scientific causes. Certainly, the sciences, in their interpretation, also use both teleology and causation, but history tends to interpret human behaviour by assuming conscious purposes, whilst science tends to limit its interpretation to the principles of causation. Comparative education, as a border study at once static and dynamic, has to use both principles. By its title 'Comparative' it has to interpret facts, as without interpretation no comparison is possible. The interpretation may be descriptive or functional. In a recent letter to the author, Professor Pedro Rossell6 defined these two methods of interpretation and pointed out that his work in the I.B.E. was limited to the interpretation of recent trends as seen from statistical information and annual reports of national ministries of education, whereas my interpretation was functional, being based on historical background. It would seem that the difference is more formal than essential. No sooner do you take the 'time-factor' into consideration than you enter the field of history, and comparisons of statistical data of a pre-war period with post-war tendencies are a part of the recent history of education. On the other hand, functional interpretation of the connections of national traditions, 'national character' and religious attitudes with present-day educational systems has to consider the social structure, the statistical division into occupational groups, the present systems of administration and organisation of schools and the statistical 'availability' of different stages of education to different groups of the population, whether racial, linguistic, religious or national. Again we see the overlapping of the two methods of interpretation, although the difference of approach is real. Some years ago a kind of "gentlemen's agreement" was reached between Unesco and the I.B.E. and the Yearbook of Education, wherein Unesco would undertake the compilation of comparative statistics, the I.B.E. the comparative interpretation of recent trends, and the Yearbook would deal with Comparative Education from a functional point of view. As the latter inevitably reflects the author's point of view and may discriminate between various groups or nations, the Yearbook of Education as an independent, unofficial publication is better suited for that purpose. Yet this division of labour, so valuable for the comprehensive efficiency of comparative research, can hardly be sustained in academic courses of Comparative Education, which have to combine all three to present to the students a three-dimensional picture.

These preliminary remarks lead us to two conclusions: first, that historical background is indispensable to any interpretation of comparative data and secondly that it has to be complemented by other approaches. To be able to understand clearly the importance of a historical approach to comparisons of various national systems of education, a few examples would seem appropriate.

As the first example we select the relations between 'society' and 'state'. Most sociologists distinguish national society from a national state. National society is the creator of national culture, including language, literature, fine arts and religious beliefs. A national state, on the other hand, is the creator of the legal cohesion of the same individuals who form the national society. Here we have a logical distinction between an external community of citizens based on law, enforced by legal government, and the internal community in creative work and beliefs, based on voluntary consent and efforts of individuals and social groups. The two fields of social activities often overlap and the state may encroach on voluntary associations of individual citizens. For instance, the state may prohibit pornographic books and indecent behaviour, may enforce its laws by police and punish the offender. But it is hardly possible to prohibit indecent anecdotes among small groups of club members or immoral conduct in secret between consenting adults. Concerning religious beliefs, history provides us with a definite answer. The principle of cuius regio eius religio could not be enforced even by the most cruel legal enactments. Heretics or non-conformists of all kinds elaborated intricate ways of verbal conformity with mental reservations and only under torture would they confess their guilt. Modern legislation prohibits torture and there are no other means of enforcing a 'thought control' when thoughts are not expressed in overt actions. To enact a law which cannot be enforced and which is opposed by public opinion is not only futile, but leads to contrary results. The area of applications of state laws is thus limited not only by logical definitions but by practical results. Yet as the two fields of social activity overlap, the frontiers of legal state action and independence of voluntary association remain rather vague and many countries have adopted different interpretations with variations of application in their educational policy. Here the logical analysis of the present situation is inadequate and only historical research can give an answer to the difference of educational policies. Thus the frontiers between society and state in each country must be explained by historical national traditions and not by logical analysis of the terms themselves. Let us examine educational legislation in some selected countries.

In England the distinction between society and state is a national tradition upheld by English philosophy and public opinion. All attempts at establishing a monopoly of religious beliefs enforced by laws of the state were countered by obstruction on the part of religious minorities and were eventually condemned by public opinion coming from the majority itself. State legislation was looked upon as a lesser evil and had to be confined to the most obvious measures necessary to maintain order. State intervention in education was rigorously opposed, since the attempts of the Presbyterians during the Commonwealth and of Anglicans during the Restoration at state monopoly were unsuccessful. Locke openly preferred private initiative to state maintained institutions and the whole controversy was between the adherents of large boarding schools (independent or 'Public') and small private schools or private tutors. When the vicar of Newcastle, John Brown, raised his voice in the sixties of the 18 th century, advocating state control in education, he was attacked by Joseph Priestley in a separate publication. When again Robert Owen, Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarians demanded state intervention in education they found few adherents in intellectual circles. When, in 1833, state intervention became a fact, it was smuggled through in an almost empty House and amounted to a negligible subsidy to voluntary societies. In this atmosphere, hostile to state intervention, the right of parents to choose the kind of education approved by them, was never challenged and even the introduction of compulsory school attendance exempted parents who could afford home education. At present, education is legally recognised as a national service, but its administration is entrusted to local authorities and voluntary associations. The most striking example of this division between society and state is presented in the fields of science and adult education. All the societies enjoying the title 'Royal', headed by the Royal Society (Academy of Science) are voluntary associations independent of any state control or interference. English universities, although in fact largely maintained by the state, are independent institutions and the Ministry of Education has no right of intervention. These features of English legislation are the sequence of historical tradition and can hardly be explained otherwise.

In France we have a different historical situation. There were many attacks of French 'society' on the monopoly of the state in order to win independence from state control. But all their attempts were met by the centralising legislation of the king, who embodied the state: l'dtat c'est moi. The Huguenots were suppressed by Louis XIV, the Jansenists shared their fate and even the Catholic Church was subordinated to the royal power (Gallicanism). The Revolution continued the same tradition, suppressed all congregations and prohibited regional dialects and local traditions in schools. Napoleon, by establishing the monopole universitaire, only expressed the same principle in a codified form. It is significant that the Academy of Sciences, which started as a voluntary society simultaneously with the Royal Society in England, was soon taken over by the state and became a public institution maintained and controlled by the government. Throughout the 19th century we see the struggle of society against the encroaching legislation of the state. It is interesting to observe how the champions of the 'liberty' of associations and individuals changed sides during the last two hundred years. Before the Revolution 'liberty' was defended by Protestants, Jansenists, philosophers and minorities of all kinds. The state identified with the church denied independence from state control to all voluntary associations. During the Revolution the tables were turned. The state represented by the Jacobins enforced secular monopoly and the Catholics became the defenders of the 'liberty' of voluntary initiative. After several revolutions and counterrevolutions conditions were stabilised under the Third Republic, when the public school system was centralised under state control, whilst Catholic schools, called I~coles Libres, were pushed outside the national system. As a result, voluntary associations are allowed by state legislation within strict limits and there is a perpetual 'cold war' between the secularist state and the Catholic society. Whereas in England the state and society combined their forces to promote national unity and English culture, in France they split the nation and national education in two opposing camps. Of course, this simplified comparison does not do justice to all factors of English or French national life, but is given here merely as an example of an historical approach to the differences on the two sides of the Channel.

Russia presents a third case which throws additional light on relations between state and society. Soviet legislation does not recognise 'society' as an independent factor of national life. They speak of 'proletarian society' or 'workers' associations' led and controlled by the Communist Party. As the latter is identified with the Soviet state, there is neither opposition nor division of functions between state and society. The state is all-embracing. It would be wrong, however, to explain this monopoly entirely from the doctrine of dialectical materialism. As is well known, Lenin taught the gradual disappearance of state powers and a total emancipation of a 'classless society'. The present state monopoly is not a theoretical limitation of voluntary initiative, but an historical tradition of Russia. Whereas in Western Europe educational systems developed from the voluntary associations of the Church and craftsmen guilds of the towns, in Russia the national system of schools was from the very start a state enterprise controlled and maintained by the Tsarist government. Since Peter the Great it was secular, utilitarian and centralised. The autocratic, enlightened Emperors (and Catherine II), during periods of reforms, recognised 'Russian society' as a separate factor and appealed for its support, but only in so far as the 'society' backed their enlightened ideas. As soon as 'society' showed signs of independence, all concessions were withdrawn and the Tsar (i.e. the state) asserted his monopoly of decisions. During reactionary periods 'society' in semi-legal liberal and illegal revolutionary groups and associations bitterly opposed the state as personified by the autocratic Tsar and developed anarchist tendencies. This partially explains why Lenin, as a revolutionary, attacked the state and why the Soviet government, following the historical supremacy of the Russian state, does not recognise 'society' as a separate factor. In consequence private schools are prohibited by law, religious instruction is tolerated only within the churches and theological academies are allowed for the training of priests only under state control. Any ideological deviation by teachers - civil servants - is out of question and leads to dismissals. Thus the relations of society and state in three selected countries are the results of historical traditions.

As a second example of the historical approach, I shall take the ideal of equality and its influence on the educational systems of England, the U.S.A. and France. The ideal of equality was inherited by Europeans from Stoic philosophy and Christian teaching. Having at first a spiritual, moral implication, it gradually acquired a political and social meaning. In England the revolution and the civil war were inspired by the ideal of liberty and not equality. The sanctity of private property and inherited privileges were accepted in the past as a matter of course and the difference between a gentleman and a common man influenced the whole conception of education and the structure of the school system. The ideal of a gentleman has undergone a gradual transformation and at present has a moral and cultural meaning and not a birth right. Nevertheless it is still important in social life and those schools which traditionally educated gentlemen have even now a privileged social position. In spite of the insistence of the Labour Party on the social equality of all Englishmen, the idea of an 61ite, whether social or cultural, is accepted by most educationists. The introduction of the three A 8 (age, ability, and aptitude) by the 1944 Act as deciding factors in education has not abolished the
prevalent notion of an 61ite but turned the scale more in favour of intelligence, whilst upholding all the other features of a gentleman. The accepted inequality of status is legally recognised in a differentiation of salaries between men and women teachers, between honours and general degrees in school appointments, or in the establishment of A, B, and C streams in schools. In spite of the general demand for "secondary education for all," the social inequality of 'public' schools, grammar schools and secondary modern schools remains a deciding factor for the majority of pupils. In fact, this historical tradition is giving way to the idea of social equality and to demands for 'comprehensive' schools, for equal salaries for all teachers irrespective of schools or sex, and for the doors of higher education to be opened to larger groups. This is the result of the changing social order, but the change itself is conditioned by the historical past.

In America the English tradition has undergone a transformation. The emergence of a new nation after the War of Independence was a revolution directed against privilege and inequality of status. The ideal of the equality of all Americans was accepted as the foundation stone of the new democracy. Although Jefferson was still influenced by the old English notion of an elite, the Jacksonian democracy definitely proclaimed the equality of all Americans irrespective of origin or education. The school system had to be adapted to the new situation. The growth of national wealth and subsequent rapid industrialisation accelerated the change from training the 6lite to mass education. High schools became available to all young people, abandoning any principles of selection, and high school curricula were adapted to all possible variations of abilities and aptitudes. The standards had to be lowered, but the necessity of general culture for all American citizens led to the foundation of Junior Colleges to make cultural equality as real as political or social equality. The professional training in the universities had to follow suit, cater for all possible careers and introduce new courses, some of which have dubious academic value and would be condemned by European universities.

In France the situation is again different from the two English speaking countries. Here, since the time of Descartes, logical thinking was accepted as a necessary qualification for any white collar profession. The intellectual 61ite was trained in Jesuit Colleges, where the doctrine of formal discipline was the basis of education. During the period of diHusion de la lumi~re in the 18 TM century, reason was proclaimed supreme and all other sources of knowledge, including that of divine revelation, were subordinated to rational thought. The French Revolution proclaimed a potential equality of all citizens in so far as all men were rational beings. But as intelligence is not inherited in equal measure, there was a necessity of intellectual selection for further training and state appointments. The famous report of Condorcet was based on the principle of intellectual selection. Napoleon said: 'la carri~re est ouverte au talent' and in his time anybody could rise to the highest level, provided he had the required intelligence and knowledge. The resultant selection was achieved by a complex system of state certifications and competitive examinations. French examinations are universally acknowledged as the most severe tests applied anywhere in the world (the mandarin examinations in old China excepted). As such they lead to a great amount of wastage (scholastic mortality) and create a large group of ddclassds, who are wanted neither in industry nor in the civil service. Thus in France the ideal of social equality is defeated no less than in the English speaking countries, but for different reasons, which depend on national historical traditions.
Yet it is evident that the historical approach by itself is unable to solve the inherent contradiction in the ideal of equality. A philosophical analysis of the term is as much needed as sociological results of its application in education.

Historical research is necessary not only in the realm of ideas but in factual situations as well. As a striking example of historical traditions in education we can point out the problem of bilingualism and the medium of instruction. The use of Latin in Western Europe, of Arabic in Moslem countries or classical Chinese in China was not prompted by utilitarian or pedagogical reasons, but by tradition and the dominance of religion in national life. The strength of that tradition is clearly seen in two hundred years of struggle of modern education with classicism and in many features of present day curricula and methods of instruction. In countries like Belgium, Eire or Canada in the West, or Pakistan, India and Ceylon in the East, the problem of the language is in the forefront of school politics and all arguments for and against a particular medium of instruction are neglected in favour of the long forgotten, historical past, which the adherents of local nationalisms champion. Even the use of a specific alphabet is decided on historical grounds rather than its phonetic suitability. We do not suggest that the historical approach leads to the best solutions of all school problems, but only state the fact that the influence of the past is often decisive even in our ultra-modem times.

As the last example of the historical approach we will take a purely material basis of education - school buildings. It is obvious that in the variety of climatic and geographical conditions school buildings should be adapted to temperatures, changes of seasons and available local material. But the style of the building, its internal arrangement and decoration and its external architecture were determined in the past and even at present not exactly by utilitarian considerations and demands of hygiene and economics. National traditions in architecture will reflect a different outlook in the school buildings of Western Europe compared with those of India or Japan. Buildings inherited from the past still embody contemporary ideas on education. Some old buildings resemble monasteries with their cloisters and austere atmosphere of dedication to spiritual ends. They represent the period when schools were controlled by religious congregations and most teachers were monks. Other old buildings resemble prisons with a gloomy, unattractive interior reflecting the view of corrective discipline necessary for the eradication of their pupils' original sin. The necessity of overall autocratic supervision prompted Jeremy Bentham to invent his Panopticon building, suitable both to schools and prisons. On the other hand, old Napoleonic lycees resemble military barracks and no wonder, since pupils of his schools wore military uniform and marched to the sounds of drums. But tempora mutantur and modern schools resemble hospitals more than anything else, again reflecting modern views on education. These changes in the style of school buildings, reflecting changes in educational ideas - we may call it Marxism in reverse - can find their explanation only in history.

Conclusion. The general conclusions which can be drawn from these arguments and examples are few, but important for the study of Comparative Education. Whereas philosophy, sociology, and economics, by comparing education in different countries, attempt to find general principles underlying the evolution of educational theory and practice, the historical approach tries to investigate the past causes of individual and group variations among religious or national communities. The differences of denominational attitudes, of national aspirations or of so-called 'national character' go deep into the past and sometimes subconsciously determine the present. Only historical investigation can bring them to the surface, illuminate their potency in the cultural lives of nations and make Comparative Education really educative.